We re-estimate our main models from the body of the article with continuous versions of the independent variables to replace the dichotomous measures. % FDI with Abusers represents the percent of a firm's sector's foreign direct investment that is made in human rights abusing states. Total FDI with Abusers represents the total dollar amount, in billions, that the firm's sector invests in abusing states. %FDI*Total FDI with Abusers is the interaction of these two terms. % Trade with Abusers represents the percent of a firm's sector's trade that is conducted with human rights abusing states. Total Trade with Abusers represents the total dollar amount, in billions, of trade a firm's sector conducts with abusing states. %Trade*Total Trade is the interaction of these two terms and takes on higher values the more a firm's sector trades with abusers and the higher the proportion this trade represents when compared to the sector's total trade. Table 1 displays coefficients for rare events logistic regression models using these continuous variables to predict whether firms do any lobbying on human rights policy. Table 2 displays coefficients from OLS regressions predicting firm's expenditures on human rights policy lobbying. The effects of FDI are consistent, while trade falls out of conventional levels of significance.
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Logistic regressions
We estimate logistic regressions with dichotomous measures of any lobbying on each of our categories of human rights legislation as the dependent variables. Results are displayed in Table 3 and conform with the rare events logistic regression results presented in the article. 
More Stringent Definition of a Human Rights Abuser
We restrict our definition of what counted as a human rights abusing country. Our main analysis in the body of the paper counts any country with a CIRI Physical Integrity score below the mean (five) as an abuser. Tables  4 and 5 , below, restricts this definition to the bottom quartile of countries. Under this more stringent cutoff, any country with a CIRI Physical Integrity Score less than or equal to three is counted as a human rights abuser. Examples of states with CIRI Physical Integrity scores less than or equal to three include Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and Iran. Examples of states that are included in our main analysis as human rights abusers, but not included in this more restrictive analysis (i.e. states with Physical Integrity scores of four or five) include Jamaica, Liberia, and Malawi. When firms invest in states that have terrible human rights records, they are more likely to lobby Congress on human rights issues and they tend to spend more money on these endeavors.
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A-6 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Tables 6 and 7 and are broadly consistent. Because few of our observations participate in human rights lobbying, our dependent variables are highly skewed. In our main analysis we use the natural log of our dependent variables to help account for this skew. However, the concern remains that the lingering skewed nature of our variables bias our results. Here, we transform each dependent variable using a Box Cox transformation, 1 which scales the variable x by a manually determined λ, using the following formula:
As λ approaches zero, this formula approaches the log(x). Using the boxcox call in R's MASS package, we calculated the appropriate λ for each of our dependent variable and transform our data. Table 8 displays the results of our analysis using these transformed dependent variables. The transformation reverses the distribution of our data. In other words, non-lobbyers are designated a larger value than lobbyers. As such, a negative coeffi cient signifi es an increase in lobbying. Our key independent variables-the interaction between investing a lot in human rights abusing states and having that investment be a high percent of ones overall FDI, and the interaction between trading a lot with human rights abusers and having that trade be a high percent of ones trade-remain highly signifi cant. 
